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Fiscal rules, such as the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), aim at constraining government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) develops a model in 
which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting. The amount of 
this  depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to 
the rule. We provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the European Union. We 
find that the SGP rules have induced governments to use stock-flow adjustments, a form of 
creative accounting, to hide deficits. The tendency to substitute stock-flow adjustments for 
budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, as in times of 
recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.  
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1 Introduction 
Fiscal rules aim at constraining the behavior of governments. They are introduced to reduce 
rent seeking behavior of politicians, to mitigate common pool problems, and, ultimately, to 
prevent undesired fiscal outcomes (von Hagen 2002). The European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) provides an important example. Governments in a monetary union have an 
incentive to run excessive deficits and accumulate excessive debts. High deficits and debt 
levels increase the pressure on the central bank to monetize them and create inflation. 
Anticipating this, the private sector adjusts inflation expectations upwards, resulting in higher 
nominal interest rates.
1 But since the (expected) inflation from monetizing a given amount of 
government debt is spread over all members of the monetary union, the cost of excessive 
deficits and debts in terms of higher inflation and interest rates is smaller, and the incentive 
for profligate fiscal behavior is larger, for each individual government than in the case of a 
national currency. 
 
Recognizing this problem, the governments of the EMU member states have adopted a set of 
rules to strengthen fiscal discipline. These fiscal rules feature a limit on the annual general 
government budget deficit of three percent of GDP and a limit on generalgovernment debt of 
60 percent of GDP. In practice, the deficit limit is considered to be the more important one in 
the policy debate. 
 
Fiscal rules necessarily refer to specific budgetary items and data. Governments can shift 
fiscal expenditures off the budget, i.e., revert to creative accounting, to circumvent such rules. 
Milesi-Ferretti (2003) analyzes the effect of fiscal rules on creative accounting in a model 
based on von Hagen and Harden (1995, 1996). In this model, the government has an incentive 
to circumvent the rule by hiding fiscal policies in less visible positions. The likelihood of 
creative accounting decreases in the cost the government has to bear if the cheating is 
detected. Furthermore, creative accounting is the more likely, the higher the economic costs 
of sticking to the rule are. If strict rules prevent the appropriate response of fiscal policy to 
(business cycle) shocks, the likelihood of creative accounting increases in the model.
2 The 
                                                 
1 In the absence of perfect international capital mobility, high debt levels may also lead to higher real interest 
rates. 
2 Milesi-Ferretti shows that more transparency of the budget is only desirable at very low levels of budget 
transparency, since in this case, governments tend to let the budget fluctuate too much. At high levels of optimal design of a fiscal rule should take the possibility of creative accounting into account. 
As a result, an optimal rule is likely to be stricter in the presence than in the absence of 
creative accounting. 
 
A number of authors have investigated the effects of fiscal rules. The literature generally 
assesses the effect on the fiscal aggregate constrained by the rules, and, in a second step, the 
effect on other, non-constrained fiscal positions. von Hagen (1991) empirically investigates 
the effects of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the US and shows that they induce 
substitution out of restricted into non-restricted debt instruments. Bunch (1991) and Sbragia 
(1996) show that debt limits on state or local governments in the US have led to an increased 
use of non-constrained public authorities to issue debt. Poterba (1994) shows that more 
restrictive state fiscal rules are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected 
deficits. Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) show that restrictive provisions to limit debt issuance at 
the state level result in the devolution of debt issuance to governments at the local level. Bohn 
and Inman (1996) find for a sample of 47 US states that only balance requirements enforced 
as constitutional (not statutory) constraints by an independently elected (not politically 
appointed) state supreme court have significant positive effects on a state's general fund 
surplus. Strauch (1998) shows that constitutional expenditure limits in the US induce a shift 
of expenditures from the (constrained) current budget to the (unconstrained) investment 
budget. 
 
Dafflon and Rossi (1999) survey the accounting tricks governments used in the run-up to the 
Euro. They find that the methodological rules of the European system of accounts are weak 
and that numerous countries have used tricks to qualify for EMU membership. Milesi-Ferretti 
and Moriyama (2004) find that in the run up to EMU membership reductions in government 
debt were accompanied by strong decumulations of government assets. These authors argue 
that, in the run up to the Euro, the fiscal rules of Maastricht led to significant fiscal operations, 
which improved the official figures but had no effect on the actual fiscal position of the 
government. The bottom line of this research is that fiscal rules have an effect on the fiscal 
aggregates to which they refer. However, governments try to compensate for the loss of 
flexibility due to the rule by shifting fiscal activities from restricted to non-restricted 
instruments. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
transparency, a further increase of transparency would hinder the working of automatic stabilizers too much and 
is therefore not optimal. In this paper we extend this line of research and test the model by Milesi-Ferretti (2003). In 
particular, we document stock-flow adjustments in the European Union, which are computed 
as the annual changes in debt levels minus the annual budget deficits. Positive stock-flow 
adjustments imply that the debt level increases by more than it should given the deficit. While 
stock-flow adjustments are a common feature of public finances due to accounting issues, 
they should generally not generate a systematic bias between the stock of debt outstanding 
and the sum of all budget deficits over time. In many EU states, however, we find that stock-
flow adjustments are persistent and that the difference between debt stocks and accumulated 
deficits is large. We interpret this as a first indication of a systematic strategic use of stock-
flow adjustment. We then investigate the effect of the fiscal rules in Europe, more precisely of 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) and the Stability and Growth pact (SGP). The SGP in 
particular puts a large weight on the deficit limit in the EMU, since, in the European public 
debate, the loss of political reputation is significant for countries breaching the deficit limit 
but not for countries breaching the debt limit. As greater attention is paid to the deficit, we 
expect that governments try to shift budget deficits (restricted) to off-budget deficits (non-
restricted) in form of stock-flow adjustments. We find that stock-flow adjustments are 
systematically related to deficits after the fiscal rules  became effective. Recorded deficits 
have been lowered by increasing stock-flow adjustments. This effect is especially 
pronounced, when the fiscal rule is binding, i.e., when governments desire to run deficits in 
excess of the formal limits. In addition, we confirm the prediction by Milesi-Ferretti (2003) 
that the use of creative accounting varies over the business cycle. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents accounting 
identities, data and measurement issues and the amount of stock-flow adjustment in the 
European Union. In section 3, we develop our estimation strategy and present the evidence on 
creative accounting in the EU. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Deficits and debt: stock-flow adjustments 
2.1 Accounting identities 
Standard textbooks in macroeconomics give equation  (1) as the fundamental relationship 
between deficits, D, and debt, B. In this definition, the deficit is calculated as the difference 
between expenditure and revenue, where expenditure includes interest payments.  
t t t D B B + = −1  (1) 
From this equation, the current debt level is equal to the accumulated past deficits plus the 










i t n t t D B B  (2) 
 
In practice, equation (1) does not always hold, if the deficit is defined as the difference 
between budgetary expenditures and revenues. A residual can be computed according to  
 
t t t t SFA D B B = − − −1  (3) 
 
This residual is called stock-flow adjustment, or debt-deficit adjustment. A positive stock-
flow adjustment means that the stock of government debt has increased between period 
() 1 − t and t  by more than the budget deficit in period t  indicates. The official definition treats 
stock-flow adjustments as a statistical residual. As the European Commission states, stock-
flow adjustments "result primarily from financial operations, e.g., debt issuance policy to 
manage public debt, privatization receipts, impact of exchange rate changes on foreign 
denominated debt. In general, these should tend to cancel out over time. However, large and 
persistent stock-flow adjustments (especially if they always have a negative impact on debt 
developments) should give cause for concern, as they may be the result of the inappropriate 
recording of budgetary operations and can lead to large ex-post upward revisions of deficit 
levels. (European Comission, DG for Economic and Financial Affaires 2003, p. 79).
3 
 
2.2 Data and measurement issues 
Deficit and debt figures very much depend on their precise definition and measurement (e.g., 
Blejer and Cheasty, 1991). In this article we use data published in the AMECO database, 
which is based on Eurostat data and serves as the basis of the EDP and the SGP. Eurostat 
follows the ESA 95 accounting standard to measure deficits and debt. The data refer to the 
general consolidated government sector, which includes the central, state and local 
                                                 
3 For recent evidence on upward revisions because of persistent stock-flow adjustments, see Balassone, Franco, 
and Zotteri (2004). government and the social security sector.
4 The definition of debt under the EDP, on which 
our data is based, slightly differs from ESA 95, as debt is recorded at face value in the EDP 
and not at market value as in the ESA 95.
5 In general, the difference between deficits and the 
change in debt levels results from the fact that public debt is a gross concept, while deficits 
are a net concept. For example, if a government issues debt and deposits the proceeds in a 
bank account, the effect if the deficit is zero, while gross debt increases.  
 
Stock-flow adjustments result from five main issues: (1), issuance of zero coupon bonds. 
Consider a bond which is issued for 90 Euro to cover a deficit and has a face value of 110. 
This operation is recorded as a deficit of 90 and a stock-flow adjustment of 20 in the year of 
issuance, since the debt level at face value increases by 110. In the following 4 periods until 
maturity, an interest of 5 accrues, impacting on the deficit, the debt level stays constant, the 
stock-flow adjustment is -5 in each period. As can be seen, stock-flow adjustments of zero 
coupon issuances should cancel out over time. (2), revaluation of debt denominated in foreign 
currency changes the face value of the debt, without having any impact on the budget. 
Revaluation of foreign denominated debt should only matter if a country has a depreciating 
currency over a long period. Foreign denominated debt does not play any significant role in 
any of the EU 15 countries. Exchange rate effects are less than 0.2 percent of GDP in general 
(ECB 2004, Table 6.3.2). (3), time-of-recording effects: Deficits are measured in accrual 
terms, while debt is a cash concept. For example, when UMTS licenses are sold, this has an 
effect on the deficit in the year of selling, so when the receipts accrue, however, debt is only 
reduced when the (cash) receipts are used to buy back the debt. The time of recording effect 
should usually cancel out after some years.
6 The only two remaining issues, where long and 
persisting positive stock-flow adjustments can be expected, are, (4), equity injections in and 
privatization of public companies  and, (5), transactions in financial assets. Selling of 
financial assets reduces gross debt, however it has no effect on the deficit according to the 
rules of the EDP and the SGP. 
 
                                                 
4 For details on the precise definitions see Eurostat 2002, p.8-16). 
5 Debt means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and 
within the sectors of general government" (Eurostat 2002, p. 190). 
6 Interest accrued affects net borrowing/net lending. "For government debt under EDP (at nominal value, not 
including accrued interest) interest due but not paid is to be recorded under Other accounts payable (F.79), as 
long as it is not paid (ESA95, §5.131). In the EDP, interest arrears under Other accounts payable are not 
accounted for in the government debt" (Eurostat 2002, p. 199). Thus, interest payments are recorded in the 
deficit when they accrue, even if they are not paid yet, and should in this case lower stock-flow adjustments as 
they are not recorded in the debt according to EDP. In the long-run, interest payments are without effect on 
stock-flow adjustment. Capital injections into public companies are an important tool to hide deficits and incur 
increases in the debt level, resulting in positive stock-flow adjustments. The operation must be 
recorded as an equity injection or transaction in shares and other equity, i.e., the government 
has to declare to have a lasting economic interest in the public company in the sense of 
intending to receive a market interest rate. If the injection is used to cover recurring losses of 
the public company, it should be recorded as a current transfer, which leaves the stock-flow 
adjustment unaffected. In practice, it is very difficult to control whether injections have been 
correctly recorded.
7 Capital injections can therefore be used to shift public expenditure from 
the (deficit-relevant) state sector to public companies. Thereby, the deficit is reduced, while 
the change in debt level captures the "true" public spending. A positive stock-flow adjustment 
results.
8 These mechanisms have also attracted the attention of the European Commission. 
Joaquín  Almunia, EU monetary affairs commissioner, has recently claimed that governments 
disguise the scale of their budget deficits.
9 
 
2.3 Debt vs. accumulated deficits: descriptive evidence 
Persistent stock-flow adjustments can be a matter of concern (European Commission, DG for 
Economic and Financial Affairs 2003, p.79).. A natural test for the persistence of stock-flow 
adjustments is to compare the debt level (column B of Table (1)) with the accumulated 
deficits as described in equation (2), i.e., the sum of the debt level of 1980 and all budget 
deficits between 1980 and 2003 as a percent of 2003 GDP (column C of Table (1)), both 
measured in percent of GDP of 2003. Calculating the difference of actual debt levels and 
accumulated deficits in percent of GDP (B-C) shows that most EU countries have regularly 
had positive stock-flow adjustments. Finland and Greece have 64 and 43 percentage points of 
GDP more debt than their budget data suggest, followed by Denmark (30), Luxembourg (29), 
Germany (15), and Austria (14). The cases of Finland and Luxembourg are noteworthy as the 
debt level should be negative if one added the deficits and surpluses. In both countries, budget 
surpluses have thus been used in the last years to buy assets instead of paying back debt.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
                                                 
7 The sale of non-financial assets reduces the deficit, as it is recorded as negative investment or more precisely 
negative public "gross fixed capital formation". 
8 Public-private partnerships can also be used to hide deficits. However, they will not automatically be seen in 
the form of stock-flow adjustments. 
9 http://news.ft.com/cms/s/cd1192f0-35cd-11da-903d-00000e2511c8.html.  
 
Off-budget debt accumulation in the form of stock-flow adjustments thus plays a considerable 
role in most EU-15 countries, with substantial variations across countries.
10 Stock-flow 
adjustments constitute a significant part of the overall debt accumulation in the member states 
of the EU. The (unweighted) annual average stock-flow adjustment in the EU amounts to 1.56 
percent of GDP in the period 1981-2003. As Figure (1)  shows, it exceeds three percent of 
GDP in some years. Average stock-flow adjustments had a declining trend until 1996. This 
negative trend may reflect the persistent efforts of European governments to comply with the 
debt limit imposed by the Maastricht Treat. Since 1996 the average SFA has risen again to 
more than two percent in 2001. A similar pattern can be seen for the average of three large EU 
economies, France, Germany and Italy.  As argued by Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2004), 
EU governments thus reduced their gross debt by selling assets rather than by improving the 
net-financial position of the government through lower deficits. This was a convenient way to 
fulfill the Maastricht criterion of falling debt levels for the highly indebted countries.  
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Source: Ameco database, authors’ calculation. 
                                                 
10 Also the US has a significantly higher debt level than given by the sum of deficits with a difference of 9 
percent of GDP in the period 1980-2003.  
Stock-flow adjustments of selected countries deserve particular attention. In Germany, the 
debt level increased by more than 6 percent of GDP in addition to the deficit in 1995, when 
the German federal government officially assumed the debt previously hidden in the 
Treuhandanstalt, the holding company of former East German industries.
11 In Greece, the 
stock-flow adjustment reached almost 19 percent in 1994, when the debt of the Greek 
government at the Bank of Greece was officially recorded as public debt. Finland experienced 
a stock-flow adjustment of 12 percent in 1992 related to the banking crisis it suffered in 
connection with the currency crisis of the Markka. The negative stock-flow adjustment of 
Belgium in 1996 is noteworthy. It reflects a booking operation designed to show that Belgium 
had a declining debt level and, therefore, qualified for EMU membership (Laughland and Paul 
1997). In summary, we find significant evidence for persistent and systematic use of stock-
flow adjustments. 
 
2.4 Stock-flow adjustments and creative accounting  
Persistent, positive stock-flow adjustments allow governments to accumulate public debt in 
excess of what is implied by the annual budget deficits. But they nay also be the result of net 
acquisitions of financial assets in times of budget surpluses. For example, a government using 
budget surpluses to accumulate reserves in pension insurance funds would have long lasting 
positive stock-flow adjustments, without hiding away any deficits. To test for this possibility, 
we check the correlation between the net acquisition of financial assets and stock-flow 
adjustments, both in percent of GDP, for the period and countries for which data were 
available, namely for the period 1996-2002, and Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 




But even if stock-flow adjustments reflect asset acquisitions, this could still be  a way to 
change official deficit figures. The data on asset acquisition do not reflect the evolution of the 
                                                 
11 In fact, when the Treuhandanstalt was dissolved, the debt of 204 billion DM were carried forward to the 
Erblastentilgungsfond. The German statistical office wanted to classify this as an increase of the debt and of the 
deficit. Theo Waigel, the finance minister at the time, however objected and argued that this debt should not 
impact on the deficit according to the Maastricht criteria. Eurostat accepted this view, which explains the large 
stock-flow adjustment in this year (Münster, 1997). 
12 The correlation coefficients have to be interpreted carefully as the data on assets refer to the non-consolidated 
general government sector, while the deficit and debt data are consolidated across government sectors. The data 
source for net asset accumulation is Annual National Financial Accounts (ANFA) dataset. value of these assets. It is possible, for example, that the asset acquisition is only a hidden 
subsidy, or capital injection into a (public) company. The public company could then engage 
in standard public expenditure, driving down the value of its assets without any impact on the 
gross debt level of the government, nor on net borrowing. We therefore conclude that the 
stock-flow adjustments observed in Europe reflect to some extent at least systematic creative 
accounting. 
 
3 Fiscal rules and stock-flow adjustments 
3.1 Approach 
Milesi-Ferretti (2003) argues that fiscal rules can induce governments to engage in "bad" or 
even "ugly" creative accounting. To test this proposition, we investigate the relationship 
between deficits and stock-flow adjustments. The SGP is a fiscal rule with a particular focus 
on budget deficits. It requires the deficit to stay below the three percent reference value and to 
have a  budget close to balance in the medium term. Following  Milesi-Ferretti (2003), the 
tendency to use stock-flow adjustments to keep reported deficits lower than the actual 
increase in public debt should have increased since the inception of the SGP. It should be 
particularly pronounced, when countries are close to breaching the three percent limit and 
when the cost of reducing the deficit is high, i.e., in times of recessions. 
 
More specifically, consider a government allocating expenditures and taxes optimally over 
time as in Milesi-Ferretti (2003). Assume that the government has derived an optimal change 
in government debt, 
*
t Δ ,for period t . If the actual change in government debt deviates from 
the optimal change, the government suffers a cost of  ( )
2 *
1 1 t t t t t B B K Δ − − = − α . The parameter 
t α   may vary over time, reflecting, e.g., different costs of deviating from the optimal fiscal 
stance at different points of the business cycle. In the absence of any constraint on the 
government budget deficit, the actual change in government debt equals the budget deficit, 
, t D  plus an exogenous, random stock-flow adjustment,  t ε , due to timing effects etc., with 
() , 0 1 = − t t E ε  where  1 − t E  denotes the expected value based on information available in period 
t-1. Thus,  t t t t t t D B B ε ε + Δ = + = − −
*
1  Note that, by assumption, the budget deficit and the 
observed stock-flow adjustment are uncorrelated.   
Assume now that there is a deficit limit, DL applying to the observed budget deficit. If the 
government violates the deficit limit, it suffers a cost increasing in the size of the violation, 
()
2
1 0 2 DL D K t t − + = β β  for  0 2 = > t t K and DL D  otherwise. Finally, assume that the 
government can use stock-flow adjustments strategically to increase government debt 
deliberately by more than the budget deficit. Let the strategic component of stock-flow 
adjustments be  t S . Thus, the total stock-flow adjustment observed ex post is  . t t t S SFA ε + =  
With a given probability p, the strategic use of stock-flow adjustments will become known to 
the public. If that happens, the government suffers a reputational cost   t t S K 1 0 3 γ γ + =  for  
, 0 > t S and 0 3 = t K otherwise. 
 
The government now has two instruments to implement the optimal change in government 
debt, budget deficits and strategic stock-flow adjustments. Formally, it minimizes the cost 
function  t t t t K K K K 3 2 1 + = =  subject to the constraint  . 1 DL D and S D B B t t t t t t < + + = − − ε  
As long as the deficit limit is not binding, the government will not use stock-flow adjustments 
strategically, and choose  () .
*
1 1 t t t t t B B E D Δ = − = − −  Assuming that the cost of deviating from 
the optimal change in government debt is known when  t t S and D  are chosen, we obtain the 
































*  (5) 
 
Thus, if the cost of deviating from the optimal change in government is small,  , .
2 γ β α < t  the 
change in government debt will be smaller than in the absence of the debt limit, and the actual 
deficit lies between the unconstrained deficit and the deficit limit. Furthermore, if the deficit 
limit is binding, the actual deficit and the strategic part of the stock-flow adjustment are 
negatively correlated. That is, the larger the strategic stock-flow adjustment, the smaller the 
observed budget deficit. This correlation increases, when the economic cost of deviating from 
the optimal change in government debt becomes large. Subsequently, we focus on this correlation to test for the strategic use of stock-flow adjustments to hide government deficits 
under EMU. 
 
Based on these considerations, we do not expect a systematic relationship between stock-flow 
adjustments and the deficit before 1998, when the SGP became binding. After 1998, however, 
governments may have used stock-flow adjustments actively to control the deficit. SFA 
becomes a policy variable, influencing the deficit level. Thus, we expect a significant negative 
relation between stock-flow adjustments and the budget deficit for the period 1998-2003, 
when EU countries had to comply with the SGP. In a first step we calculate the correlation 
coefficients between stock-flow adjustments and deficits in the two periods for all EU 15 
countries. In the first period (1980-1997), the correlation is -0.03 and insignificant, in the 
second period (1998-2003) it is -0.53 and statistically significant. 
 
This simple correlation analysis allows neither for country-specific effects nor for 
autocorrelation in the variables caused by business cycle fluctuations. We therefore employ 
the following more elaborate panel econometric approach. From identity (3), we know that 













1 ,  
is the sum of stock-flow adjustment in percent of GDP ( ) it sfa  and the deficit in percent of 
GDP () , it d  i.e.,  it it it d sfa b + = Δ . Estimating the following equation 
 
it it it sfa b ε α α + + = Δ 1 0  (6) 
 
gives  1 α  as: 
 









= α  
























, + =   (7)  
If  1 1 = α , we know that the covariance between deficits and stock-flow adjustments is zero. A 
coefficient smaller (larger) one implies a negative (positive) covariance between sfaand d. 
The following regression allows to estimate the impact of the fiscal rule. 
 
it i t it t it it T sfa T sfa b ε μ α α α α + + + + + = Δ . 3 2 1 0  (8) 
 
where  t T  is a dummy that takes a value of 1 for the years 1998-2003 and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient  2 α  measures the effect of the dummy (the fiscal rule) on the level of the change in 
debt levels. 3 α  measures the effect of the fiscal rule on the relationship between sfa and the 
change in debt levels. The coefficient  3 α  gives the impact of the fiscal rule on the covariance 
between the deficit and  . sfa  Given that our hypothesis of no relation between  sfa and d  
before the introduction of the rule holds true, i.e.,  1 1 = α ,. the coefficient   3 α  then directly 
measures the covariance between deficits and stock-flow adjustments after 1997. A negative 
coefficient  3 α  implies, that the covariance between deficits and stock-flow adjustments 
became negative in the second period. An increase in the stock-flow adjustment () it sfa  would 
therefore result in a lower deficit. 
 
In order to separate the effects of structural from cyclically adjusted deficits, we specify an 
alternative regression model: 
 
it i t it t it it T d T d b ε μ β β β β + + + + + = Δ . 3 2 1 0  (9) 
 
where  t T  is again a dummy that takes a value of 1 for the years 1998-2003 and zero for the 
years before. The effect of the fiscal rules (the treatment effect) can then be calculated 
accordingly. A negative coefficient  3 β  implies, that an increase in the deficits () it d  results in 
a lower stock-flow adjustment as a consequence of the introduction of the fiscal rule. The 
coefficients  3 β  and  3 α  should be of the same sign as they reflect the same covariance. To 
capture the effect of the structural and the cyclical part of the deficit, we augment equation 9 
and estimate  








it t it T d d T d d T b ε μ β β β β β β + + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + + = Δ 5 4 3 2 1 0  (10) 
 
where 
s d  specifies the cyclically adjusted (structural) deficit, whereas 
c d  is the cyclical part 
of the deficit. We expect the coefficient  3 β  to be of similar size as the coefficient  3 α  since 
the largest part of the deficit is structural. For  5 β  the model by Milesi-Ferretti (2003) predicts 
a larger coefficient, i.e., we expect creative accounting to be used strongly with the business 
cycle. 
 
To test whether creative accounting is most prevalent, when the rule is binding, we further 
augment the approach. We separate empirically the effect of the introduction of the rule 
captured by the time dummy from the effect the rule has on governments, whose policy 
objective is to spend more than 3 percent of GDP in excess of their revenues. Since in this 
case, we expect countries to employ SFA systematically to lower the deficit, we cannot 
identify the policy objective by looking at the deficit. Instead, we identify the intention of the 










 if the fiscal rule is in place. If 
the rule applies only to those countries, which breach the 3 percent criterion, then only those 
countries intending  to increase their debt level by more than 3 percent should engage in 
creative accounting. Countries below that limit should show no particular attempt to engage in 
creative accounting.
13 This means that the correlation between stock-flow adjustments and 
deficits should be negative when the rules are in place (second period) and the change of the 
debt level is above 3 percent. It should be zero, when the change of the expected debt level is 
below 3 percent. 
 










it it t t it it sfa R T sfa R R T R sfa T T sfa b ε μ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ + + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + + = Δ 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  
 (11) 
where  () 3 | 1 1 > Δ = − t it
e
it I b E if R  is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the expected change in 
debt is larger than 3 percent of GDP. In this view, governments will engage in creative 
                                                 






t  we can be sure, that the government meets the criteria set by the pact. accounting if they expect their newly accumulated debt to be above three percent. We 
therefore expect  7 γ  to be significantly negative, implying a strong negative correlation 
between sfa and deficits, when the rules are in place (second period) and binding (expected 
debt level change larger 3). The effect of the introduction of the rule, given by  , 3 γ  should 
become insignificant, if we assume that the rule is not binding when countries have a deficit 
below three percent. Finally, as given by the accounting identity, we expect sfa to contribute 
as above one to one to an increase of the debt level, i.e.,  . 0 1 6 1 = = γ γ and  
 
An obvious problem of these approaches is the simultaneous equation bias, which renders the 
least square estimator inconsistent  (Gujarati (1995, pp. 642) and Greene (2000, pp. 652)). We 
therefore ran two stage least square instrumental variable estimators and instrumented with 
the lag of the variables. To address the endogeneity of R, we instrumented the realized  it R  
with the appropriate lags. However, in this approach we cannot take account of serial 
correlation. Serial correlation can be expected as the change in the debt level  b Δ depends on 
the business cycle. 
 
We therefore specify a dynamic panel model with the lagged dependent variable included as a 
regressor. We use the dynamic panel estimator by  Arellano and Bond (1991), restricting the 
number of lagged levels to 5 in the instrument set.
14 To address the simultaneous equation 
bias and endogeneity bias, we explicitly allow   sfa T sfa ⋅ , , and for the extended approach in 
addition  T R and R sfa T R sfa R ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , ,  to be endogenous variables. This means that all 
possible lags until  1 − t  of these variables in levels are included as instruments for these 
endogenous variables. 
 
3.2  The effect of fiscal rules 
The basic empirical results are shown in Table (2). 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
                                                 
14 An extension of the instrument set to all possible lags did not change any of our results. A reduction of lags 
also has robust results. Stock-flow adjustments, as the accounting identity suggests, contribute to the change in the 
debt level with a coefficient close to one, the 95 percent confidence interval for regression 1 is 
[0.819,0.992]. Increasing the stock-flow adjustment per GDP by 1 percentage point results in 
roughly one additional percentage point debt level per GDP. However, this changes in the 
second period, when an increase in the stock-flow adjustment results in  3 1 α α +  additional 
debt, and stock-flow adjustments do not translate into higher debt on a one to one basis. As 
the coefficient  1 α  is statistically not different from 1, the estimated coefficient  3 α  represents 
the covariance between stock-flow adjustments and the deficit in the second period, which we 
find to be significantly negative. In regression (1) of Table (2), an increase of sfa  by 1 
percentage point results in a -0.25 percentage point lowering of the deficit. This suggests that 
stock-flow adjustments has become a policy variable to control the deficit in the time period 
when the fiscal rule was in place. In the earlier period, the regression results do not imply any 
correlation between stock-flow adjustment and deficits. Thus, our results indicate that the 




To check the robustness of our results, we omit a number of countries and observations. 
Finland and Sweden are dropped, as Finland had positive stock-flow adjustment because of 
budget surpluses invested into assets, and so did Sweden in some years. We also drop 
Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg, as all three countries had positive stock-flow adjustments 
because of asset purchases (regression 2). Also some of the Greek figures might be distorted 
in the early to mid-nineties, and we also know that the data in the later years were wrongly 
reported (regression 3). Then we also drop the three non-Euro countries, which are officially 
subject to the fiscal rules, however, without being subject to fines in case of non-compliance 
(regression 4). In a further regression, we drop Germany and France, as it might be difficult to 
enforce sanctions against them. They might therefore be less constrained by the fiscal rule 
(regression 5). We also exclude the observations from the 1980s, as in this period, the 
emergence of any set of rules was not discussed (regression 6). None of these control 
regressions changes our results.
16  
                                                 
15 It is possible that strong negative shocks to the budget induce the government to increase deficits and stock-
flow adjustments, thereby causing a positive correlation. Our result is strengthened, since we find the negative 
relationship to prevail. The systematic use of creative accounting thus outweighs possible shocks (e.g., resulting 
from control errors) affecting the deficit and stock-flow adjustments in the same direction. 
16 With the robustness check, we show that the significance of our regression coefficients does not depend on the 
choice of countries and methods. It is not possible, however, to compare the magnitude of the regression 
coefficients, since the standard errors are too large.  
The results based on regression equation (9) confirm this finding and are given in the 
appendix, Table 5.  In the first period, there is no systematic relationship between stock-flow 
adjustment and deficits, while in the second period a negative co-variance emerges.
17 An 
increase in the deficit by one percentage point is associated with a lowering of the stock-flow 
adjustments by –0.32 percentage point. This figure is also robust to changes in the sample. 
 
We then separate the effect of the cyclically adjusted deficit and the cyclical component of the 
deficit (Table 3) . We use the two official measures of cyclically adjusted balances provided 
by the European Commission. The first is based on the output gap in a structural model, the 
second is based on an HP-filtered trend.
18 The estimation results based on potential output are 
presented in the left part of the table, while trend output results are given on the right side of 
the table. In the regression, we include the cyclically adjusted deficit (CAD) and the cyclical 
part of the deficit (CD). Again the coefficient for the first period is close to 1 as we expect for 
the structural deficit and for the cyclical deficit. Thus, in the first period we do not find a 
significant correlation between deficits and stock-flow adjustments. For the second period, 
however, there is a clear negative correlation between the structural deficit and stock-flow 
adjustments for both calculation methods similar in magnitude to the previously estimated 
coefficient.
19 The cyclical component of the deficit and stock-flow adjustments in the second 
period are very strongly negatively correlated. In fact, an increase in the cyclical deficit in the 
second period is almost completely offset by reductions in stock-flow adjustments, indicating 
that stock-flow adjustments are used to weaken the impact of the cycle on the deficit. 
 
Insert Table 3 around here 
 
Table 3 also provides robustness checks for the impact of cyclical and structural deficits on 
the use of stock-flow adjustments. Similar to the other robustness checks, we drop various 
countries from the sample. Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden are dropped because of their 
surpluses, Greece is dropped as data quality is problematic, Denmark, Sweden and the UK are 
dropped as they do not belong to the Eurozone, and finally Germany and France are dropped 
                                                 





  cannot be rejected 
with a p-value of 0.71. The coefficient  3 β  for the interacted term thus again measures the covariance. 
18 For details on the de-trending methodologies of the EU, see European Commission (2004, pp. 79). 
19 In most EU countries, the structural deficit represents the largest part of the total deficit. as sanctions and warning letters are difficult to enforce against them. The estimation results 
confirm the previous results. For the second period, there is a stong negative correlation 
between the cyclical part of the deficit and stock-flow adjustments for both calculation 
methods. Any change in the cyclical deficit is almost completely offset by a corresponding 
change of sfa. 
 
To show the robustness of our results to changes in the methodology, we also report the 
results of a non-dynamic model, neglecting the simultaneous equation bias (Tables (6 - 8)). 
OLS and fixed effect regressions yielded similar results.
20 To control for heteroscedasticity, 
we also run generalized least squares. However, Monte-Carlo simulations by  Beck and Katz 
(1995) show that GLS provides over-optimistic standard errors in panels of our size, therefore 
we present the panel corrected standard error results in the Tables. Overall, the model fits the 
data reasonably well. The size of the coefficients is slightly larger than in the Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimator, as expected. In the entire investigated period, the average debt accumulation 
per year given stock-flow adjustments of 0 percent of GDP was roughly 4.5 percent of GDP, 
in the second period it went however down by almost three percentage points. In this sense 
the "treatment", the introduction of fiscal rules is successfully reducing debt accumulation, 
especially the recorded deficit. 3 α  remains statistically significant and negative. In the second 
period, an increase in the deficit by one percentage point resulted in roughly -0.3 lower 
deficits. The coefficients for the cyclical and structural component of the deficit are similar to 
the benchmark regressions. Especially the cyclical part of the deficit is offset by an equally 
strong movement of stock-flow adjustments. 
 
The regression coefficients robustly indicate that governments have used stock-flow 
adjustments systematically to hide deficits since the fiscal rules are introduced in Europe. This 
is especially relevant for the cyclical component of the deficit. 
 
3.3. The effect of binding fiscal rules 
Our regression analysis so far shows that after the introduction of the fiscal rules, stock-flow 
adjustments have become a policy instrument to control the evolution of the deficit. In this 
section we want to extent this point and separate empirically the effect of the introduction of 
                                                 
20 The F-test on the fixed effects indicates that country specific effects are significant. the rule from the effect the rule has on governments, when it actually constrains their 
intentions. 
 
As a first test, whether the sfa increases when the constraint of the SGP becomes binding, we 
compare the average sfa in the group of observations with  3 > Δb  before and after the SGP 
was in place with the average of sfa for the other group ( ) 3 < Δb  sfa increased more in the 
first group than in the second group (0.36=(2.99-2.19)-(0.94-0.5)). This indicates, that the use 
of sfa as a way to incur new debt has especially increased in the group of countries, for which 
the rule on deficits is binding. 
 
The econometric results aimed at testing whether creative accounting increases in importance, 
when the fiscal rules become binding, are presented in Table 4. We present panel fixed effect 
regressions and dynamic Arellano Bond estimation results.
21  
 
Insert Table 4 around here 
 
The first, somewhat surprising result concerns the coefficient on sfa and the deficit. It is now 
only 0.5 and 0.43 respectively for the whole sample. However we also find a significant 
interaction term R . sfa of 0.38 and 0.35, where we expected a zero coefficient. This means 
that countries with a lower change in debt show a negative correlation between deficits and 
sfa, while for debt level changes above 3 percent we find a coefficient close to the previously 
estimated 1 implying no correlation between sfa and deficits. This effect is driven by budget 
surpluses as we conclude from a look at the scatterplots. Countries with budget surpluses in 
general do not use these surpluses to reduce their debt levels but instead have a tendency to 
buy assets. This observation is in line with our descriptive evidence of section 2.3, where the 
largest discrepancy between debt and accumulated deficits are observed for Finland, a country 
with significant surpluses. 
 
We therefore estimate the proposed model for only those observations, where the deficit is 
positive (i.e., we dropped observations of budget surpluses in  columns B of Table 4). Now, 
the coefficient on sfa has the expected value, i.e., 1, stock-flow adjustment contribute to 
                                                 
21 In the Arellano Bond estimation procedure we addressed the endogeneity issues discussed above.  increases of the debt level on a one to one basis, no negative correlation between sfa and 
deficits exists in general.  
 
In addition, the effect of sfa on the change in debt is the same for R = 1 and R = 0. The 
coefficient on sfa interacted with the dummy for the second period is insignificant. This 
means, that no general negative correlation between sfa and deficits can be observed in the 
second period. 
 
In contrast, we find a strongly significant and negative effect for the coefficient on sfa 
interacted with the dummy for the period when the SGP was in place and a dummy for those 
observations, where countries intend to increase their debt levels by more than 3 percent. This 
means, that for those observations, for which the rule is expected to become binding, a 
negative regression coefficient for sfa of -0.62  is estimated, implying a negative correlation 
between sfa and deficits in case of a binding fiscal rule. 
 
Again, we check the robustness of the estimation results by dropping a variety of countries in 
the estimation. The results are presented in Table 9 in the appendix. The results confirm the 
result. The estimated coefficient on the simple interaction term for the second period becomes 
insignificant. This means, that the imposition of the SGP does not result in a significant 
general use of sfa to improve the budget. We find a significantly negative coefficient for the 
interaction term R*T* sfa. This means that those governments that intend to run deficits 
beyond the three percent limit heavily resort to stock-flow adjustments instead of the deficit to 
comply with the legal limits.
22 
  
The extended estimation gives a more detailed view on the empirical effect of fiscal rules.
23 
The results show, that any intended increase of the debt level beyond three percent under the 
SGP regime was almost exclusively done by increasing stock-flow adjustments instead of 
officially published deficits. Stock flow adjustments were, however, not used as a general 
mean to reduce the deficit to comply with the pact's provision to balance the budget in the 
medium term. These results are in line with evidence taken from political debates. The debate 
among policy makers almost exclusively focussed on the "magic" three percent threshold. At 
this threshold, we also find creative accounting to become relevant. The robustness tests 
                                                 
22 The same results are obtained when using deficits as the explanatory variable. 
23 A separate estimation of the cyclical effects for binding vs. non-binding fiscal rules was not possible because 
the relatively short sample period yields only few observations. further confirm that governments in general heavily resort to creative accounting in the EU, 
when their desired fiscal stance does not comply with the binding fiscal rule. 
4 Conclusions 
Fiscal rules are introduced to constrain governments. EU countries have adopted a set of rules 
to constrain deficits with the goal to keep debt levels sustainable. We have given evidence 
that deficits in Europe provide only limited information on the evolution of debt levels in the 
past. 
 
We then have tested the hypothesis that governments try to circumvent fiscal rules by means 
of creative accounting. Our empirical evidence indicates that the introduction of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and the Excessive Deficit Procedure in Europe have resulted in creative 
accounting. While stock-flow adjustments have significantly contributed to debt accumulation 
in the last twenty years in Europe, only after the introduction of the fiscal framework in 
Europe a systematic relationship between these adjustments and deficits can be detected. 
Furthermore, this use of creative accounting is especially responsive to cyclical parts of the 
deficit, where the associated costs of the non-state-contingent fiscal rule are high. The use of 
creative accounting is especially measurable, when the fiscal rules become binding. Our 
results confirm the vulnerability of fiscal rules due to creative accounting.  
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Table 1: Debt and accumulated deficits in percent of GDP 
 
Country   debt, 1980   debt, 2003   sum of deficits   difference  
  A   B   C   B-C  
Austria   36   66   52   14  
Belgium   79   103   100   3  
Denmark   36   43   13   30  
Finland   11   45   -19   64  
France   20   63   54   9  
Germany   31   64   49   15  
Greece   25   101   58   43  
Ireland   75   33   25   8  
Italy   58   106   99   7  
Luxembourg   9   5   -24   29  
Netherlands   46   55   53   2  
Portugal   32   58   53   5  
Spain   17   51   47   4  
Sweden   40   52   50   2  
United Kingdom   53   40   39   1  
Source: Ameco, own calculations; The accumulated absolute deficits were added 
to the initial debt level of 1980 (column A) for all countries, except Greece (1988), 
Luxembourg and Ireland (1990), Sweden (1993), and Spain (1995) due to data 
constraints. This cumulative debt measure was divided by GDP of 2003. 
  
 
Table 2: Measuring the impact of fiscal rules. 
 
Δbit   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
sfa   0.91   0.95   0.97   0.94   0.88   0.89   0.95  
  0.04   0.04   0.04   0.05   0.05   0.05   0.05  
T   -1.55   -1.11   -1.31   -1.16   -0.88   -1.84   -0.91  
  0.33   0.31   0.32   0.31   0.37   0.37   0.42  
T*sfa   -0.25   -0.40   -0.38   -0.33   -0.32   -0.18   -0.36  
  0.08   0.09   0.10   0.10   0.09   0.08   0.08  
cons   0.04   -0.02   -0.01   0.00   0.00   0.03   -0.14  
  0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.05  
LDV   0.51   0.45   0.44   0.46   0.53   0.50   0.41  
  0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.04  
obs.   263   233   221   220   212   221   183  
Sargan p 








omitted   SE,FI   SE,FI,LU  SE,FI,GR   SE,DK,UK  DE,FR   <1991  
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. 
LDV refers to the lagged dependent variable. Last line refers to which observations 
were omitted. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. Method: 




Table 3: Measuring the impact of fiscal rules on the cyclical component of the deficit 
Δbit       Δb        
CAD1  0.82 0.89 0.81 0.78 0.75 CAD2  0.80 0.91 0.85 0.81 0.79 
  0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08   0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 
T*CAD1  -0.20 -0.16 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 T*CAD2  -0.21 -0.15 -0.21 -0.23 -0.20 
  0.12 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.14   0.12 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.14 
CD1  1.01 1.41 1.18 1.03 1.28 CD2  1.15 1.34 1.03 0.88 1.14 
  0.13 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.15   0.13 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.14 
T*CD1  -0.83 -0.91 -0.87 -0.64 -1,05 T*CD2  -0.88 -0.89 -0.81 -0.53 -1.03 
  0.25 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.27   0.33 0.24 0.22 0.29 0.29 
T  1.44 1.53 1.63 1.30 1.79 T  1.42 1.59 1.67 1.32 1.80 
  0.49 0.57 0.43 0.52 0.54   0.48 0.57 0.43 0.54 0.54 
Cons  0.19  -0.16 -0.20 -0.18 -0.25 cons  0.18  -0.18 -0.21 -0.18 -0.26 
  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04   0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
LDV 0.17 0.15 0,15 0.16 0.13 LDV  0.17 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.13 
  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06   0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Obs 263 221 250 212 221   263 221 250 212 221 
Sargan  1  1  0.79 0.99 0.99   1  1  0.78 0.99 0.99 
Autocorr 
2,p  0.59 0,31 0.94 0.65 0.67   0.59 0.34 0.92 0.66 0.66 
Omitted    FI, LU. SW  GR  DK, SW,UK DE,FR    FI,LU,  SW  GR  DK,SW,UK  DE,FR 
            
 
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. LDV refers to the lagged dependent variable. 
CAD1=Cyclically Adj. Deficit, CD1= Cyclical component both based on potential output. CAD2=Cyclically Adj. Deficit, CD2= Cycli- 
cal component both based on HP filtered output trend. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. Method: Arellano Bond dynamic 
GMM panel estimator. Deficit, and interaction term specified as endogenous variables. 
  
Table 4: Measuring the impact of binding fiscal rules 
 
Δbit   fixed effect   Arellano-Bond  fixed effect   Arellano-Bond  
sfa   0.40   0.50   1.06   0.95  
  0.12   0.08   0.21   0.14  
R*sfa   0.54   0.38   -0.09   -0.03  
  0.13   0.09   0.22   0.14  
T*sfa   0.12   -0.03   -0.23   -0.11  
  0.15   0.10   0.42   0.26  
T*R*sfa   -1.14   -0.51   -0.89   -0.62  
  0.28   0.18   0.49   0.29  
R   3.67   2.24   2.83   1.46  
  0.39   0.27   0.45   0.30  
T   -1.56   -0.63   -1.28   -0.24  
  0.39   0.31   0.54   0.40  
T*R   -0.95   -0.22   -0.87   0.24  
  0.96   0.61   1.02   0.63  
cons   2.03   0.02   3.31   -0.06  
  0.28   0.02   0.38   0.03  
LDV     0.41     0.37  
   0.03     0.03  
obs   293   263   225   180  
R
2
  0.74     0.77    
Sargan     0.32     0.95  
autocorr 2, p     0.79     0.68  
omitted observations   none   none   budget surplus  budget surplus  
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. 
R=1 if  , 3 > Δb  LDV refers to the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors are reported 
below the coefficients. Methods: Panel fixed effect (FE) and Arellano Bond dynamic GMM 
panel estimator (AB). 
 
 
 Appendix  
Table 5: Measuring the impact of fiscal rules  
Δbit   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
deficit   0.85   0.88   0.91   0.91   0.81   0.84   0.88  
  0.07   0.08   0.09   0.08   0.08   0.08   0.10  
T   1.81   1.77   1.87   1.91   1.50   2.14   1.38  
  0.46   0.48   0.52   0.41   0.49   0.53   0.65  
T*deficit   -0.32  -0.27   -0.23   -0.27   -0.28   -0.31   -0.36  
  0.10   0.12   0.15   0.11   0.11   0.12   0.12  
cons   -0.19  -0.16   -0.17   -0.16   -0.17   -0.23   -0.18  
  0.03   0.04   0.04   0.03   0.04   0.04   0.08  
LDV   0.17   0.20   0.18   0.22   0.18   0.17   0.08  
  0.05   0.06   0.06   0.05   0.06   0.06   0.07  
obs.   263   233   221   220   212   221   183  
Sargan p   1   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00  
Autocorr 2, p   0.76   0.34   0.34   0.44   0.68   0.83   0.80  
omitted     SE, FI   SE, FI, LU  SE, FI, GR   SE, DK, UK   DE, FR   <1991 
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. LDV 
refers to the lagged dependent variable. Last line refers to which observations were 
omitted. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. Method: Arellano Bond 





Table 6: Robustness check: Measuring the impact of fiscal rules with different  
methodologies.  
Δbit  
OLS   FE   PCS
E   Δbit  
OLS FE    PCS
E  
PCSE   PCSE  
sfa   0.96   1.07   0.98   deficit   0.98 1.04 1.01    
  0.09   0.07   0.05     0.05 0.06 0.08    
T   -3.56   -3.63  -2.37   T   -0.4   -0.16  -0.2   -0.53   -0.52  
  0.54   0.38   0.78     0.4   0.39  0.57  0.61   0.59  
T*sfa   -0.53   -0.41  -0.32   T*deficit   -0.46 -0.46 -0.47   
  0.19   0.13   0.11     0.12 0.11 0.13    
cons   4.34   4.15   4.13   cons   1.73 1.48 1.07  1.11    1.24   
  0.3   0.21   0.93     0.28 0.29 0.66  0.52    0.53   
     CAB       1   0.95  
           0.069   0.07  
     T*CAB       -0.34   -0.34  
           0.15   0.15  
     CD       1.21   1.39  
           0.17   0.17  
     T*CD       -0.98   -1.12  
           0.36   0.34  
R
2
   0.43   0.61   0.71   R
2
   0.69 0.67 0.71  0.79    0.79   
obs   293   293   293   observations   293   293   293   293   293  
ctr. d.   no   no   yes   ctr. d.   no   no   yes   yes   yes  
     output       trend   potential  
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. In  
the panel corrected standard error (PCSE) regressions we took account of possible  






Table 7: Robustness check: Measuring the impact of fiscal rules 
Δbit   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE  
sfa   1.00   1.02   1.09   0.94   0.98   1.03  
  0.06   0.06   0.07   0.06   0.06   0.06  
T   -2.31   -2.56   -2.13   -2.18   -2.94   -2.82  
  0.69   0.70   0.64   0.69   0.82   0.79  
T*sfa   -0.39   -0.39   -0.41   -0.33   -0.3   -0.44  
  0.12   0.14   0.14   0.13   0.12   0.11  
cons   4.08   4.25   3.92   4.03   4.45   4.35  
  0.84   0.85   0.84   0.87   0.88   0.78  
R
2
   0.75   0.76   0.71   0.71   0.72   0.77  
obs   259   245   244   236   247   189  
ctr. 
dummies   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
ommitted   SE, FI   SE, FI, LU   SE, FI, GR  DE, FR   SE, DK, UK  <1990  
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. In the panel 
corrected standard error (PCSE) regressions we took account of possible autocorrelation in the error 
term. 
  
Table 8: Robustness check: Measuring the impact of fiscal rules 
Δbit   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE   PCSE  
deficit   1.11   1.14   1.18   0.97   1   1.06  
  0.09   0.10   0.08   0.08   0.08   0.11  
T   0.11   0.23   0.32   -0.36   -0.23   0.61  
  0.53   0.66   0.51   0.51   0.68   0.6  
T*deficit   -0.44   -0.38   -0.49   -0.41   -0.48   -0.5  
  0.12   0.17   0.11   0.13   0.15   0.16  
cons   0.64   0.46   0.35   1.24   1.11   0.46  
  0.64   0.69   0.63   0.63   0.73   0.61  
R
2
   0.75   0.75   0.75   0.74   0.71   0.74  
observations   259   245   244   236   247   189  




DE, FR   SE, DK, 
UK  
<1990  
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. All regressions 
include country dummies. In the panel corrected standard error (PCSE) regressions we took account 
of possible autocorrelation in the error term. 
  
Table 9: Robustness check: Measuring the impact of binding fiscal rules 
 
Δbit   FE  AB FE AB  FE  AB FE  AB 
sfa  0.80 0.74  0.40 0.50  0.38 0.46 0.39  0.49 
  0.20 0.13  0.12 0.08  0.13 0.09 0.12  0.09 
R*sfa  0.21 0.12  0.53 0.34  0.58 0.43 0.53  0.36 
  0.21 0.13  0.13 0.09  0.14 0.10 0.13  0.09 
D*sfa  -0.29 -0.21  0.12 -0.04  0.09 -0.07 0.20  0.04 
  0.28 0.18  0.15 0.10  0.16 0.11 0.16  0.11 
R*D*sfa  -0.83 -0.52  -0.95 -0.24  -1.18 -0.65 -0.96  -0.43 
  0.39 0.25  0.35 0.22  0.32 0.21 0.32  0.21 
R  3.04 1.99  3.65 2.26  3.37 1.89 4.29  2.69 
  0.44 0.29  0.39 0.27  0.44 0.31 0.44  0.31 
D  -1.79 -0.47  -1.55 -0.61  -1.40 -0.13 -1.70  -0.79 
  0.44 0.35  0.38 0.31  0.46 0.35 0.45  0.35 
R*D  -0.43 0.19  -0.70  -0.19  -0.87 0.22 -2.30  -1.07 
  0.99 0.61  0.97 0.62  1.01 0.65 1.24  0.79 
cons  2.76 -0.01  1.76 0.03  2.38 -0.02 1.91  0.03 
  0.35 0.02  0.27 0.02  0.33 0.03 0.32  0.03 
LDV   0.39    0.42    0.43    0.39 
   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03 
obs  245 221  278 250  236 212 247  221 
R
2  0.77   0.73   0.73  0.77   
Sargan   0.86   0.85   0.99   0.94 
autocorr  2   0.67   0.90   0.78   0.82 
ommitted 
FI, LU, 
SW   GR  
DK, 
SW, UK   DE, FR   
Note: Dependent variable: Change in the debt relative to GDP. T=1 if year>1997. R=1 if 
, 3 > Δb  LDV refers to the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors are reported below the 
coefficients. Methods: Panel fixed effect (FE) and Arellano Bond dynamic GMM panel 
estimator (AB). 